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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITORS NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of DIcTA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such ac-
tion being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)
BOXING COMMISSION-DISCRIMINATION - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-No. 11969.-Antlers Athletic Association vs. Har-
tung, et al, as Members of State Boxing Commission-De-
cided December 31, 1928.
Facts.-The Athletic Association is a non-profit corpora-
tion organized for the purpose of conducting boxing exhibi-
tions, the profits of which are turned over to various charities
under the auspices of the Benevolent and Protective Order
of Elks. This action was brought to test the validity of the
statute permitting boxing exhibitions, providing for a Box-
ing Commission, and prescribing that no such exhibition shall
be conducted unless 5% of the gross receipts are paid as a tax
and unless the promoter of the exhibitions owns the place
where they are to take place or has a lease for at least one year.
Various ex-service men's organizations are excepted from
these provisions and the Association contends that this is an
unconstitutional discrimination.
Held.-Exhibitions such as prize fighting, which are con-
ducive to disorder, may be forbidden altogether by the stat-
ute and are subject to regulation by the legislature, which
may prescribe conditions under which such exhibitions may be
given. The alleged discrimination in favor of ex-service
men's organizations is within the discretion of the legislature.
Judgment Affirmed.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS-FAILURE OF CONSIDERA-
TION.-No. 12201.-Charles Fischer vs. Robert J. Hill.-
Decided January 21, 1929.
Facts.-The plaintiff below signed a note for $1500, pay-
able to the defendants, and the trust deed securing the same.
One Siener negotiated the loan, and caused the trust deed to
be recorded. The plaintiffs were borrowing the money rep-
resented by the note from the defendants, and the loan was
arranged through Siener. Defendants gave him the cash and
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plaintiffs gave him the note and trust deed. He appropriated
the money, recorded the trust deed and kept the note. Three
days later he was arrested and was sent to the penitentiary. In
the lower court a question as to whose agent Siener was was
submitted to the jury, which found that he was acting as agent
for the defendants. The evidence was conflicting.
Held.-The evidence being conflicting and the matter
having been properly submitted to the jury, their finding
that Siener was the agent of the defendants will not be dis-
turbed and that finding necessitates the conclusion that there
was a failure of consideration as the plaintiffs received noth-
ing for the execution of the note and trust deed.
Judgment Affirmed.
CORPORATIONS-POWER OF DIRECTORS TO MORTGAGE PROP-
ERTY.-No. 12,176.-Metalloid Company vs. Luboil Refin-
ing Company et al.-Decided January 21, 1929.
Facts.-The Luboil Company being indebted to the
Metalloid Company on an open account borrowed an
additional amount, and pursuant to a resolution of the Board
of Directors, the Vice President and Secretary of the
Luboil Company executed and delivered its promissory note
for the combined amounts, payable to the order of the Metal-
loid Company, and also delivered a mortgage to secure the
payment of the note. The Luboil Company is a manufactur-
ing corporation and the mortgage covered all of its property.
The matter was never considered at any meeting of the stock-
holders, nor was any stockholders meeting called for that pur-
pose. The Metalloid Company brought suit to foreclose the
mortgage, and certain stockholders of the Luboil- Company
intervened and resisted the foreclosure.
Held.--That Section 2263 Compiled Laws of 1921 is for
the protection of stockholders, and a mortgage executed in
violation of such provisions will be declared void. In the in-
stant case there having been no stockholders meeting and the
mortgage not having been submitted to the stockholders as
provided for by Section 2263, the mortgage is not good as to
them and cannot be foreclosed. The fact that some of the
directors were also stockholders does not obviate the difficulty
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for they acted as directors and not as stockholders. The stat-
ute need not be pleaded but is one of which the Courts take
judicial notice.
Judgment Affirmed.
FRAUD--LEGAL PROCESS.-No. 12168.-Dixon vs. Bowen.-
Decided January 28, 1929.
Facts.-The plaintiff brought an action to recover dam-
ages as the result of a conspiracy formed and carried out by
the defendants whereby in an action unlawfully brought by
one of the defendants against the plaintiff, all of the defend-
ants fraudulently with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff
procured a judgment against him on an alleged debt which
the plaintiff did not owe, and enforced the same by wrongful
seizure and sale of his automobile. A demurrer was filed to
the complaint and whether the complaint stated facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action was raised. The lower court
sustained the demurrer.
Held.-The Complaint clearly states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for fraudulently making use of
legal proceedings. It is not a suit to set aside the judgment
upon which the legal process issued, but is clearly an action
which in itself recognizes the judgment, but proceeds on the
theory that the judgment has been paid in law and satisfied,
and the plaintiff seeks judgment to recover damages for the
fraud of the defendants in procuring it.
Judgment Reversed.
PRACTICE-PLEADING.-No. 12167.-David vs. Gilbert.-De-
cided January 28, 1929.
Facts.-Action to recover damages for breach of con-
tract. The plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for
the sale and purchase and trade of certain automobiles. The
plaintiff alleged a full compliance with the terms of the con-
tract on his part, and that the defendants refused to deliver
the new automobile and refused to return the consideration
paid at the execution of the contract. The defendant denied
that the plaintiff had complied and stated that the plaintiff
had failed to sign an order as required on the original con-
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tract. The plaintiff's replication denied all new matter. The
plaintiff admitted that he had not signed an order, but stated
that the defendant was fully familiar with the type of car,
and that the defendant had waived that requirement. The
case was tried to a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs. Defendant filed a motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto, and also a motion to set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial. Both motions were denied and judgment was
entered in accordance with the verdict.
Held.-A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is
a motion belonging peculiarly to a plaintiff, and should not be
considered when interposed by the defendant. There was no
error in the refusal to sustain said motion, neither was there
any error in the admissibility of evidence. The pleadings
clearly raised an issue of all matters and the answer in itself
made a complete issue, and nothing could be added by alleg-
ing as new matter what had already been made an issue in
the case by denial.
Judgment Affirmed.
TAXATION - EXTENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT. - No.
12269.--Curtis vs: Montrose High School District-De-
cided January 11, 1929.
Facts.-The Trial Court awarded a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing Curtis as County Assessor of Montrose
County to extend upon his books a levy of 5 mills for the cur-
rent expenses of the Montrose County High School District.
The Board of County Commissioners made a levy of 5 mills,
which is 1 mill in excess of the limit prescribed in Sections
8411 and 8412 of the Compiled Laws. The Colorado Tax
Commission approved the increase to 5 mills, but the Assessor
extended the levy for 4 mills only, refusing to extend it for
S mills, and brings the decision of the Trial Court granting
the peremptory writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court for
review.
Held.--That Sections 8411 and 8412 of the Compiled
Laws of 1921 control the facts in this case, and Section 7216
of the Compiled Laws of 1921 does not afford the right to an
additional levy. The tax for High School purposes, under
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the law and under all of the Sections above referred to, may
not legally exceed 4 mills.
Judgment Reversed.
TROVER-FRAUD AS DEFENSE-RIPENED FRUIT AS SUBJECT.-
No. 12252.-Koerner et al. vs. Wilson-Decided January
14, 1929.
Facts.-Wilson brought suit against Koerner, who was
the Sheriff of Fremont County, and against Chillino, who
was a judgment creditor of the plaintiff's father, in trover for
the wrongful seizure by the defendant of certain property in
the possession of the plaintiff, which belonged to the plaintiff
to-wit: apples and apple boxes, some of the apples being on
the ground and some on the tree. Judgment was entered for
plaintiff and defendant appealed.
Held.-That the defense of fraud in an action of trover
must be affirmatively pleaded and proved.
Ripened fruit, though still on the tree, is under the cir-
cumstances of this case fructus industriales and properly the
basis of an action in trover, being personal property.
Judgment Affirmed.
RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EDiTOR'S NoTB.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting de-
cisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-No. 99562, Div. I.-City and
County of Denver vs. William S. Lail and Federal Surety
Company-James C. Starkweather, Judge.
Facts.-Action by City to recover, on Lail's bond as Pub-
lic Trustee, moneys received by Lail and not paid over in the
sum of $7,233.60, and a penalty of 25% thereon, together with
interest. On and prior to July 23, 1924, Lail was Clerk and
Recorder, Ex-officio Clerk of the City and County of Denver,
appointed thereto by the Mayor at a salary of $2500.00 a year,
as fixed by the Charter. On that date, the Mayor in writing
appointed Lail to be "Public Trustee of the City and County
of Denver". Lail and the Federal Surety Company as surety
executed a bond reciting Lail's appointment "to the office of
